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Abstract. This article is a book review of The Democratic Experience and Political Violence. The book
was co-edited by David Rapoport, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California,
Los Angeles and Leonard Weinberg, Foundation Professor of Political Science at the University of
Nevada, Reno.
Today's global mantra? Conveyed by global mass media it is "democracy and free markets." Through
democracy and free markets lies human salvation--or so we are told. Certainly there is room to question
both aspects of the mantra as well as the necessity of their linkage. For example, free markets have
never been free. Even if markets were completely free of formal and informal, de facto, counterfactual,
and a-factual barriers, economic disparities between and among partners in trade and commerce would
subvert freedom through generating relationships of exploitation and subjugation--an economic
psychosexuality of sadomasochism.
As another example, as free as markets might become, their very existence and nurturance might not
best be contingent on democracy or on any specific political model. Or perhaps, as far as free markets
might be a boon instead of a bane to human welfare, they might prop up variants of totalitarianism,
authoritarianism, democracy, and various combinations and mutations--some well-articulated, others
still to be conceived. Or perhaps, the reason free markets have never or will never be free is contingent
on politics--i.e., any politics as articulated through political theorists including the variants of democracy.
It is democracy that is the focus of Rapport and Weinberg. At Issue is the aspect of the global mantra
that reifies democracy as both prophylaxis and cure to human violence within nation-states. To the
discerning reader, however, the Issue soon becomes how to account for the development of the global
mantra given the extremely ample historical data that should have been both prophylaxis against and
cure for the mantra.
The elaboration of historical data found in The Democratic Experience and Political Violence originates
from a 1997 conference wherein participants and then others noted what might charitably be termed an
ignoring or discounting and less charitably an active reluctance and aversion to considering democracy
as begetter of violence. What follows are preceis of the chapters--each supported by theory and/or data
in examining the democracy-violence connection.
Rapoport and Weinberg explore democratic elections, conceive elections as a mode of political
succession, contrast electoral with hereditary modes of succession, and note the aspects of each that
seem to require contestation and stimulate the option of violence. The reader might well note that this
chapter sets the stage of employing a welcome "seeing is believing" standard for the consequences of
democracy.
Finn, Professor of Government at Wesleyan University, explores the inevitability that particular groups-that may be extrapolated to social, economic, ethnic, ideological, and any other performative entity that
may be stigmatized--are excluded from the electoral, political process in a democracy. Of special
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contemporary interest is the exclusion of professed or suspected anti-democratic groups that may
employ violence whether or not they are excluded or included and even if they are chosen by "the
people" as electoral winners. Of great interest and value is Finn's appendix on selected constitutional
and statutory provisions for electoral exclusion, pp. 70-74.)
Guelke, Professor of Comparative Politics, Queen's University, Belfast, describes and compares three
1996 democratic elections--viz., the Israeli general elections, the Northern Ireland forum elections, and
the Western Cape (South Africa) local elections. Violence permeated them all--be it political violence, its
threat, or fear of it. Moreover, violence seems to affect not just the actual vote but also campaign
behavior, attitudes of the electorate, interpretations of the vote, and the essential public discourse of
democracy.
Philpott, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, analyzes the
political construct of self-determination that has been and continues to be publicly embraced by so
many socially constructed groups--albeit in a manner that leaves universal human rights behind and
approaches a malignant or pathological narcissism, if not an outright psychopathy or sociopathy.
Although self-determination is almost always linked with the construct of democracy, it is frequently
associated with political leaders who have something very different in mind and is differentially
construed by leaders of representative democracies. Self-determination, unfortunately, has a long track
record of legitimizing violence during its quest and afterwards.
Crenshaw, John E. Andrus Professor of Government, Wesleyan University, describes the military
intervention of India as guarantor of a peace settlement in Sri Lanka's still ongoing ethnic civil war.
Although not technically an example of violence within a democracy, the intervention can be seen as
violence within a national grouping of Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils. Moreover, contending interest
groups within democratic India, international ethnic groupings professing democratic leanings, and
democratic Sri Lanka--as well as the larger strategic and even moral interests of democratic entities-have too often influenced decision-making that instigates and exacerbates violence.
Israeli, Professor of Islamic, Middle Eastern and Chinese History, Hebrew University, Jerusalem,
describes the responses of Western democracies to what he and political authorities of these
democracies term "fundamentalist Islamic violence" both within and external to these entities. The
reader of this chapter may wonder whether Western democracies are capable of resolving political
violence while retaining democratic essentials and are incapable of coherently construing democratic
essentials of political violence. The reader also can profitably integrate this chapter with that of Finn's
on political exclusion.
Simons, Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Los Angeles, presents a seemingly
optimistic analysis of the absence of "widespread identity-based communal violence" in the United
States. However, the reader might note that many other aspects of violence are well-represented
within the United States democracy including what can be termed the insidious and omnipresent
disciplinary and punitive features of organizational life that may render one bereft of one's soul even as
the body remains intact. Also, some readers might wonder whether there is a tradeoff in democracy
between communal and other variants of political violence.
Barkun, Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University, analyzes the "radical right" in the United
States as it justifies violence in the name of democracy within a nation-state that also justifies violence
in the name of a democracy that--some readers might posit00is de facto controlled by "the right."
2
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Ultimately, the psychological dynamics characterizing both levels of violence and violence justification
may appear to be equivalent.
Sprinzak, Founding Dean, Lauder School of Government, Policy and Diplomacy, Interdisciplinary Center
in Herzliya, describes extremism--especially militant messianism--and violence in Israel. He traces the
longitudinally concurrent development of Israeli democracy and of Jewish political violence within and
proximal to Israel. An intriguing conclusion is that violence is not an aberration of democracy or an
indicator of democracy's weakness but a reinforcer of the democratic essence.
Korbonski, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles, traces tensions
towards violence and towards political violence in Eastern Europe from the post-World War era through
the disestablishment of the Soviet Union and beyond. A close reading of this chapter seems to suggest
that increasing ethnic homogeneity within democracies or within entities attempting to become
democratic may facilitate democracy and minimize violence. Can this too easily be taken as a
prescription or rationale for ethnic cleansing in the service of democracy? In addition, what is posited as
trauma generated by World War II and the post-War Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe may have
significantly modified collective attitudes, perhaps even national characters, that, in turn, facilitated
non-violent political change towards democracy. Here democracy may seem founded on an intensely
violent foundation and to require transfusions of violence.
Le Vine, Professor of Political Science, Washington University, St Louis, presents a counterfactual
analysis of the proposition that democracy may require increments of violence to preserve itself. This
proposition is attributed by Le Vine to former United States President Thomas Jefferson and may
already be shared by readers who have read the previous chapters in this book. Le Vine strongly
marshals theory and data against the proposition and the reader can benefit from studying his annex
depicting so-called free democracies' crises of legitimacy and violent challenges (pp. 287-292).
Eubank, Associate Professor, University of Nevada, and Weinberg engage in counterfactual analysis of
the contentions that "civic communities" must be well-established to support a viable democracy; that
these "communities" require long incubation periods; and that democracy is, therefore, likely to fail
when violence and authoritarianism have been previously well-established. In the context of Italy, these
authors contend that regions with the strongest essentials of democracy also have had the most salient
histories of Fascism and Fascist violence. The reader might wonder what this bodes for the staying
power of democracy, its sequelae, and its own actualized and potential violence. Also, the advancing of
practical as well as statistical significance to make one's case would be welcome (cf. Table 1, p. 301).
Gans, Professor of French, University of California, Los Angeles, may well cut right to the chase and
provide a psychological vehicle for political violence regardless of political system. He cites Pericles'
funeral oration as recounted in Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War to posit that as perceptions of
democracy as fairer than other political systems increase, perceivers who fail according to their own
criteria within a democracy will even more seethe with resentment and justify violence. Thus, the
reader may conclude, democracy must contend with the two violent threats of those who view it as
unfair whether they win or lose and those who view it as fair but still lose. Isn't this just about
everyone?
Hewitt, Professor of Sociology, University of Maryland Baltimore Country, describes four examples of
terrorism within the United States--examples that, presumably, don't qualify as "widespread identitybased communal violence" according to Simons in an earlier chapter. These examples include (1) White
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racist violence in the South during the modern Civil Rights era, (2) the violence of African-American, selfprofessed revolutionary groups, (3) predominantly White leftist, self-professed revolutionary violence,
and (4) predominantly White anti-abortion violence. The reader may note the analysis' lack of attention
towards democracy as an elicitor--ineluctable or otherwise--as opposed to merely a context for such
violence. It is the reviewer's perspective that Hewitt is committing the fundamental attribution error
especially regarding political violence attributed to the African-American (at the time, black) groups (cf.
Tables 2, p. 334, and Table 5, p. 341).
Miller, Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati, and Schaen, doctoral student in political
science, University of Cincinnati, rightly critique the deprivation-frustration-aggression hypothesis that
has for so often and so long been employed to explain urban riots among African-Americans in the
1960s. This hypothesis frequently cannot adequately explain or account for empirical data on violence
obtained by behavioral and political scientists and can too facilely blame the perpetrators as opposed to
factors of a more systemic and macromolecular nature. However, Miller and Schaen seem to attribute
responsibility for political violence more to the law enforcement representatives of democracy, thereby
obfuscating malignant structural aspects of democracy.
Rapoport and Weinberg conclude that "Outbreaks of violent conflict occur even in the most stable and
successful of the democracies...." and that "Problems existing outside the democratic context also exist
within it...." Their co-authors amply support these conclusions that are very frequently absent from
public discourse on international affairs and matters of globalization. For this reason alone, The
Democratic Experience and Political Violence demands to be read.
Additionally, the reader might be left pondering the tension between two other conclusions of Rapoport
and Weinberg. One is that "communism, fascism, national socialism and lesser ideological blueprints for
human betterment largely have passed from the scene no longer capable of exciting genuine
enthusiasm...these ideologies were secular religions" and many people have, therefore, lost "a faith that
has dominated one's life for years..." (pp. 362-364). The other is that "coming to a realistic
understanding of democracy's limitations may be something else" (p. 364)--that is, more difficult to
accomplish than jettisoning the above secular religions.
The tension lies in the following. Can one realistically apperceive democracy and still maintain it as a
secular religion? Should democracy be or remain a secular religion? Is there yet another religion-secular or otherwise--that fits the bill for a world without or with minimal violence. Or is it the very
psychology of religion in all its structural, process, and functional aspects that is part of the genesis of
violence? Or yet again is the evolutionary psychology of homo sapiens such that the very discourse
about political process and violence can do no more than beget false consciousness?
So as we began the review, so shall we end it. For today's global mantra bearing on democracy as
prophylaxis and cure for violence, Rapoport and Weinberg's book can be a necessary prophylaxis and
cure. This book is timely, provocative, and of great potential value for readers who wish to cut through
the self-subjugating boilerplate that passes for informed opinion in the current era of globalization. (See
Bacigalupe, G. (2000). Family violence in Chile: Political and legal dimensions in a period of democratic
transition. Violence Against Women, 6, 427-448; Benson, M., & Kugler, J. (1998). Power parity,
democracy, and the severity of internal violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42, 196-209; Caro
Hollander, N. (1997). Love in a time of hate: Liberation psychology in Latin America. Rutgers University
Press; Montiel, C. J., & Wessells, M. (2001). Democratization, psychology, and the construction of
cultures of peace. Peace & Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7, 119-129; Prager, J. (1993). Politics
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and illusion: A psychoanalytic exploration of nationalism. Psychoanalysis & Contemporary Thought, 16,
561-595; Rapoport, D.C., & Weinberg, L. (Eds.). (2001). The democratic experience and political
violence. Frank Cass.) (Keywords: Democracy, Rapoport, Violence, Weinberg.)
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